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 ‘For eschewing of trouble and 
exorbitant expense’: 
Arbitration in the Early Modern 
British Isles 
Margo Todd*  
The history of binding arbitration in British customary law is very long, and in 
scope, very broad.  In Scotland and in England, in settings both urban and rural, 
commercial and ecclesiastical, and across a broad range of social estates, from 
craftsmen to lords, alewives to merchant princes, it had by the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries become the default mechanism to avoid costly litigation, and to 
resolve disputes likely otherwise to end in bloodshed.1  It was often a device to 
avoid the courts, since litigation was always expensive and time-consuming; how-
ever, in a great number of cases it occurred in cooperation with legal processes.  
Frequent referral by the courts, and the regularity with which judges and other court 
officials themselves served as arbitrators, demonstrates that arbitration was by no 
means consistently extra-judicial, and that the strangely lingering myth of judicial 
hostility towards it is in dire need of quashing.2  It could operate independently, but 
it also found a place in all of the overlapping legal systems that competed for juris-
diction in the British Isles.  While its referral from equity and common law courts, 
especially those at the highest levels, has received scholarly attention, the evidence 
of recent research demonstrates its regular use also at quite local levels and its very 
frequent referral by ecclesiastical, merchant, borough, and guild courts.  In nearly 
all such cases, both of the elements in this essay’s title – “trouble” and “expense” – 
played a role.   Arbitration was ubiquitous because it had distinctive advantages 
over litigation in efficiently achieving its larger goal – making peace at a time when 
                                                          
* Margo Todd is Walter H Annenberg Professor of British History at the University of Pennsylvania. 
 1. This dating requires a caveat: more documents have survived from the early modern period than 
from earlier centuries, and it is likely that the rate at which arbitration was sought in the Middle Ages 
may have been just as high.  See Edward Powell, Arbitration and the Law in England in the Late Middle 
Ages, 33 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC. 49, 55 (1983); Edward Powell, Settlement of Dis-
putes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century England, 2 L. & HIST. REV. 21, 43 (1984); Michael Clanchy, 
Law and Love in the Middle Ages, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN 
THE WEST 47-67 (John Bossy ed., 1983) (on settlement by arbitration – pactum per amorem – in Norman 
and Angevin England); DEREK ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES: 
ENGLAND 1154 TO 1558 (2013), DEREK ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION: DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION UNDER ELIZABETH I (2015). 
 2. R.L. STOREY, THE END OF THE HOUSE OF LANCASTER (London, 1966) (regarding arbitration as a 
temporary stopgap for justice seekers in the troubled fifteenth century, when the common law courts 
were so corrupt under weak monarchies as to be inoperative); J.G. BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC ORDER 
IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (1972) (echoing this view).  See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 51-52, 57-59, 84-99, 105, 113-15, 128-42, 126 (1918) (re-
printed in 2012). 
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the general violence level was very high in England, and when feud still persisted 
in Scotland.3 
Its first advantage was simply that it was community-based.  Early modern ar-
bitrators were generally local men: when dealing with disputes, they had the ad-
vantage of knowing the quarrelers and their families, and the local history of how 
particular kinds of disputes had been handled in the past.  Their store of personal 
knowledge made them the preferred resort, for instance, of burgh courts and eccle-
siastical tribunals at the parochial level.  In English archidiaconal and consistory 
courts and in Scots referrals from protestant kirk sessions (the lowest level of church 
courts there), slander and defamation cases were particularly numerous in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries; local arbitrators were equipped to set a particular 
slander within the context of family quarrels over time, even over generations, by 
numerous individuals within families at odds.4  They were able, accordingly, to seek 
the origins of longstanding quarrels, and to deal with complicated facets of a dispute 
that may not have been alleged in a suit, making them much more likely to be able 
not only to resolve the particular slander at issue, but even to settle the larger quar-
rel.5  In property disputes, like cattle theft or the moving of boundary markers, the 
theft itself could be a matter for the courts, but the long background that might ex-
plain it would likely not appear in a suit, but could be known to local arbitrators.  
Their goal was to avoid future trouble between their neighbors, and they were better 
placed than outside judges to do so if they could consider and address the source of 
the quarrel.  By the same token, commercial disputes in early modern London “were 
generally decided by reference to merchants as arbitrators,” sensibly so since these 
men were aware of the larger circumstances and relationships of trade which gen-
erated the disagreements.6 
The ultimate goal of arbitration was not punishment or reparation, but peace-
making and the fostering of harmony.  The Lords of Council in the 1530s promoted 
it “for amity to be had amongst them [the disputants] in times coming;”7 their de-
clared desire was “the weal of both parties, kindness and friendship to be had among                                                           
 3. KEITH BROWN, BLOODFEUD IN SCOTLAND 1573-1625: VIOLENCE, JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN 
EARLY MODERN SCOTLAND (1986); Jenny Wormald, Bloodfeud, Kindred, and Government in Early 
Modern Scotland, 87 PAST & PRESENT 1, 54-97 (1980). 
See PAUL GRIFFITHS, LOST LONDONS: CHANGE, CRIME, AND CONTROL IN THE CAPITAL CITY, 1550-
1660 (2008) (discussing violence levels in early modern England); J.S. Cockburn, The Nature and Inci-
dence of Crime in England 1559-1625: A Preliminary Survey, CRIME IN ENGLAND, 1550-1800, at 49-71 
(Cockburn ed., 1977) (same); IAN ARCHER, THE PURSUIT OF STABILITY: SOCIAL RELATIONS IN 
ELIZABETHAN LONDON (1991) (same); STEVEN RAPPAPORT, WORLDS WITHIN WORLDS: STRUCTURES 
OF LIFE IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY LONDON (1989) (same); BELLAMY, supra note 2 passim (same); KEITH 
WRIGHTSON, ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1580-1680, at 66, 184, 222 (1982) (same); A.J. Fletcher & J. Stevenson, 
Introduction, in ORDER AND DISORDER IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 1 passim (A.J Fletcher & J. Ste-
venson eds., 1985) (same). 
 4. See LAURA GOWING, DOMESTIC DANGERS: WOMEN, WORDS AND SEX IN EARLY MODERN 
LONDON (1996) (discussing the apparently rising numbers of such cases in sixteenth-century English 
ecclesiastical as well as common law courts); J.A. Sharpe, ‘Such Disagreement betwyx Neighbours’: 
Litigation and Human Relations in Early Modern England, in DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND 
HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST 167, 171 (John Bossy ed., 2003) (same). 
 5. See e.g., 1618 Falkirk settlement, National Records of Scotland [NRS], ms CH2/400/1, 28-31 
(arbitration of extended family quarrels). See Powell, Settlement, supra note 1, at 36-37, 55-56 (making 
the point about arbitrators knowing disputants for the later Middle Ages). 
 6. William Jones, An Inquiry into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in Great 
Britain and the United States, 25 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 445, 451 (1958). 
 7. NRS ms CS 5/43, folio 173 (The Lords of Council also sat as the Court of Session, the highest 
civil court in Scotland, constituted in 1532 as the College of Justice.). 
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them the parties, their kin, and friends.”8 They judged “not by law, but by common 
sense and bonds of affection.”9  In the opinion of the Earl of Sussex, writing in 
1568, arbitration was the best way to settle civil disputes because the normal “pro-
ceeding of law breeds in these parts a grounded hatred between the parties.”10  The 
noble goal of arbitration was instead to “pass to concord,” in order “that kindliness 
should be cherished more, and discord driven out.”11   That was best accomplished 
not by declaring a winner and penalizing a loser, as in a litigated case, but by arriv-
ing at a compromise acceptable to all concerned, one in which both parties could 
come away with their heads held high, witnesses recognizing that there was right 
on both sides.12 
A second advantage of arbitration – one that naturally gets quite a lot of atten-
tion – is that it was cheaper and quicker than litigation.  The title of this essay quotes 
a 1534 Scots plaintiff who sought arbitration for a property case already before the 
Court of Session (a pricey enterprise), “for eschewing of trouble and exorbitant ex-
penses”: Borthwick v Hoppringle was ultimately decided by King James V, who 
had been appointed arbitrator by the pope in response to a request by Hoppringle’s 
landlord, the archbishop of St Andrews.13  Even with the cost of traveling to the 
itinerant king’s court, the plaintiff saved money.  An anonymous English treatise 
on arbitration echoed the sentiment in the next century: “arbitrement is much es-
teemed and greatly favored by our common law; the end thereof being privately to 
compose differences between parties by the judgement of honest men, and to pre-
vent the great trouble and frequent expense of law-suits.”14  In an early seventeenth-
century Staffordshire case, a plaintiff reportedly paid his attorney £22 a year to pur-
sue litigation, “to the impoverishing of many poor people” who presumably might 
otherwise have benefitted from his alms.15  (A laborer at the time was fortunate to 
earn £14 annually.)16  Arbitration was generally free or nearly so, even in London: 
merchant arbitrators seem not to have accepted payment until the later eighteenth 
                                                          
 8. NRS ms CS 6/1, folio 59v. 
 9. Clanchy, supra note 1, at 52. 
 10. National Archives, Kew [NA] ms SP 15/14, fol. 72 (1568-Oct. 1569); Sharpe, supra note 4, at 
175-76 (providing similar sentiments). 
 11. Craig Muldrew, The Culture of Reconciliation: Community and the Settlement of Economic Dis-
putes in Early Modern England, 39 THE HIST. J. 915, 942 (1996); Carole Rawcliffe, ‘That kindliness 
should be cherished more, and discord driven out:’ The Settlement of Commercial Disputes by Arbitra-
tion in Later Medieval England, in ENTERPRISE AND INDIVIDUALS IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 
99-117 (J. Kermode Stroud ed., 1991). 
 12. JOHN GUY, THE CARDINAL’S COURT: THE IMPACT OF THOMAS WOLSEY IN START CHAMBER 97 
(1977); Martin Ingram, Communities and Courts: Law and disorder in Early Seventeenth-Century Wilt-
shire, in CRIME IN ENGLAND, 1550-1800, at 126-27 (Cockburn ed., 1977); Powell, Settlement, supra 
note 1, at 39. 
 13. NRS ms CS 6/4, folio 16v (Feb. 23 1534).  See JAMES BALFOUR, 2 PRACTICKS 411-17, 511-18 (P. 
McNeill ed., Stair Society 1963) (1754) (written 1574-83) (discussing arbitration and mediation proce-
dures in Scots law). Wormald, supra note 3, at 132 (finding that both arbitration and mediation had been 
in regular practice in Scotland since the thirteenth century, when informal amicabiles compositores be-
gan making regular appearances in judicial processes). 
 14. ARBITRIUMN REDIVIVUM: OR THE LAW OF ARBITRATION A3 (1694); John Dawson, The Privy 
Council and Private Law in the Tudor and Stuart Periods: I, 48 MICH. L. REV. 393, 424 (1950) (pointing 
out that the majority of cases before the Elizabethan and Jacobean Privy Councils were referred to arbi-
tration, in part to save litigants’ costs, and that the  letters that appointed arbitrators to “hear and end” a 
dispute often ended with the phrase, “so that we will be no more troubled”). 
 15. COLLECTIONS FOR A HISTORY OF STAFFORDSHIRE: QUARTER SESSION ROLLS V 1603-06, at 212 
(S. Burne ed., 1940). 
 16. Id. 
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century.17  The decision of arbitrators could involve payment by an offending party 
to the other, of course, and there was sometimes a notary’s or scribe’s fee entailed, 
but arbitrators themselves were generally unpaid.18  Only at the very highest level 
was legal counsel involved in disputes referred by equity courts.  In Bishop of Ely 
v. Lord Hatton (1677), Chancery referred the matter (a property dispute over valu-
able buildings in Hatton Garden) to arbitration by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treas-
urer, three bishops, Viscount Fauconbridge, Chief Justice North, and others “to hear 
the matter debated by counsel learned on both sides.”19  This latter provision 
brought significant legal costs into the equation, but the process did bring quick and 
equitable settlement.  Finally, a “multiplication of costs” could be saved by all con-
cerned by using mediation or arbitration to circumvent corrupt court officials, as 
work on the Quarter Sessions records of seventeenth-century Wiltshire demon-
strates.20 
As for speed, a 1622 treatise on merchant law commended arbitration as the 
best way to resolve disputes with “all brevitie” and so “to avoid interruption of traf-
fick [business].”21  It was good advice: the seventeenth-century London merchant 
John Paige opined that it was “better to lose somewhat of your right than contest or 
go to law.”22  Disputing freightage costs in a slave trading voyage, he preferred to 
avoid litigation against the ships’ owner since he was “like to be plunged into a 
vexatious suit which will hinder me from [my] business.”23  Arbitration was quick, 
perhaps especially so because local fellow-merchants did the arbitrating: they were 
quite aware that in the commercial world, time is money.24  North of the border, 
Scots arbitrators generally delivered their resolutions on the same day the dispute 
was brought to them, with the longest efforts lasting no more than a few weeks.  In 
February of 1571, for example, the Perth merchants John Bacilly and James Powton 
“referred them to decision of William Fleming and John Peblis,” two other mer-
chants, “anent eight bolls, eight pecks barley claimed by Powton, and has accepted 
the same to be decided betwixt this [day] and Fastronseven [the day before Lent] . 
. . and the parties sworn to abide thereat” – that is, they took an oath, called the 
                                                          
 17. JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF MANSFIELD 70 n.256 (2004) (citing 
JOHN PALMER, SUPPLEMENT TO THE ATTORNEY AND AGENT’S TABLE OF COSTS 73 (1833).  BELLAMY, 
supra note 2, at 83 n.83 (stating that for Tudor England more generally that there were no court costs or 
lawyers’ fees for arbitration, and that it was generally local, eliminating the costs of travel to a legal 
center).  In most Scottish arbitrations legal counsel is likewise absent. Id. 
 18. OLDHAM, supra note 17, at 70 n.256 (citing JOHN PALMER, SUPPLEMENT TO THE ATTORNEY AND 
AGENT’S TABLE OF COSTS 73 (1833)); BELLAMY, supra note 2, at fn. 83. 
 19. LORD NOTTINGHAM’S CHANCERY CASES II 487-89 (E.C. Yale ed., 1961). 
 20. Ingrim, supra note 12, at 110-34; T.E. Hartley, Under-sheriffs and Bailiffs in some English 
Shrievalities, c. 1580 to c. 1625 BULLETIN OF THE INST. OF HIST. RES. 47, 164-65 (1974). 
 21. CONSUETUDO MALYNES, VEL LEX MERCATORIA (1622). 
 22. CRAIG MULDREW, THE ECONOMY OF OBLIGATION: THE CULTURE OF CREDIT AND SOCIAL 
RELATIONS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 200-01 (1998).  See also Muldrew, The Culture of Reconcil-
iation, supra note 11, at 925-27.  Robert Tittler, The Emergence of Urban Policy, 1536-58; in THE MID-
TUDOR POLITY C. 1540-1560, at 74-93 (R. Tittler & Jennifer Loach eds., 1980) (noting that after 1550, 
towns began to acquire new charters of incorporation, giving them the right to hold courts of record for 
suits of civil pleas, suggesting that before this date arbitration was the principal means to settle credit 
and debt cases because courts not of record could only have heard suits of less than 40s value.  Arbitration 
nonetheless remained popular in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in English towns); id., 
Appendex: borough incorporations, 1540-58, at 93. 
 23. MULDREW, ECONOMY OF OBLIGATION, supra note 22, at 200-01. 
 24. Id. 
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compromissio, to adhere to the settlement or award (the arbitrium ).25  Arbitrators 
clearly recognized that the dispute before them could be part of a growing problem 
best nipped in the bud – in this case, within a week. 
A third advantage of arbitration was its regularized and broadly uniform pro-
cedures, both in England and in Scotland, across a great variety of venues and at 
levels from very local to the center.  All were aimed at quick resolution, fair judg-
ment, public reconciliation of public quarrels, and binding devices including bonds 
and ritual performances.  Post-Reformation ecclesiastical courts at the most local 
levels received disputes from plaintiffs or their neighbors, or from parish priests and 
churchwardens in England, and referred many, sometimes the majority of them, 
either to particular designated arbitrators (in general, with two or three men selected 
by each party and an ourisman, umpire or tie-breaker chosen by the court): thus a 
1580s dispute concerning the rental incomes of the Perth hospital was referred to 
arbitration by four named men on each side, “the minister being overman,” with a 
notation that the laird of Moncreif, alleged to be debtor to the hospital, “promises 
to stand at their deliverance.”26 
In some towns, disputes went directly to semi-permanent arbitration panels.27  
In the Edinburgh suburb of the Canongate, for instance, boards of between four and 
six arbitrators sat at least weekly (sometimes thrice a week) from the 1560s for 
“reconciling all those that they knew were at variance” before Sunday services, re-
ceiving particularly large numbers just before communion Sundays.28  No court re-
ferral was required; participation was voluntary, and the boards seem to have been 
extremely popular.29  They were comprised of persons of good repute from the 
                                                          
 25. Perth & Kinross Council Archives [PKCA] ms B59/12/6 (n.f.) (Feb. 15, 1571) (although with the 
holiday just a few days off).  This is one of a plethora of examples: the generalization is based on a 
reading of the hundreds of extant kirk session minute books from 1560 through the 1640s, and presbytery 
and General Assembly records from the same period (most in NRS mss CH2); bailies court minute books 
from Perth for the 1550s-1660 (PKCA mss B59), guild minute books from the same burgh (e.g. National 
Library of Scotland [NLS] ms 19239); and Justiciary Court Records (in the NRS JC series) and royal 
and other correspondence from the period related to the author’s ongoing study of the royal burgh of 
Perth from the 1540s through the Cromwellian occupation.  See MARGO TODD, THE CULTURE OF 
PROTESTANTISM IN EARLY MODERN SCOTLAND (2002) (discussing ecclesiastical records more broadly); 
Consistoire, guilde and conseil: les archives des consistoires Écossais et l’urbanisation de la culture 
paroissiale, 153 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DE L’HISTOIRE DU PROTESTANTISME FRANÇAIS 3, at 635-48 
(Droz, 2007) (for guild minutes).  See Powell, Arbitration, supra note 1, at 54 (discussing the medieval 
use of the compromissio, the oath to uphold the award by arbitrators, usually with a significant financial 
penalty for reneging). 
 26. THE PERTH KIRK SESSION BOOKS 1577-1590, at 401 (Margo Todd ed., 2012). 
 27. Christopher Haigh, The Clergy and Parish Discipline in England, 1570-1640, THE IMPACT OF THE 
EUROPEAN REFORMATION: PRINCES, CLERGY AND PEOPLE 1570-1640, at 125-142 (Bridget Heal & Ole 
Grell eds., 2008) (finding that of course, an unknown but presumably very large number were doubtless 
mediated by parish priests or ministers). See also MARK BYFORD, THE PRICE OF PROTESTANTISM: 
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN ELIZABETHAN ESSEX: THE CASES OF HEYDON AND 
COLCHESTER, 1558-1594, at 322 (1988) (discussing efforts at systematic parochial arbitration of disputes 
in English puritan parishes); W.J. SHEILS, THE PURITANS IN THE DIOCESE OF PETERBOROUGH, 1558-
1610, at 120-21 (1979) (same). The kirk session itself could also sit as an arbitration panel; for example, 
the session’s 1585 ruling that “so many as were at variance” should bring their quarrel to “the decision 
of the minister and elders, [and] that in case their party adversary would not appoint with them, that they 
should be admitted to the communion and the party obstinate should be repelled therefrom and excom-
municated.”  PERTH KIRK SESSION, supra note 26, at 324. 
 28. THE BUIK OF THE KIRK OF THE CANAGAIT, 1564-1567, at 16-17, 24, 29-32, 257 (A.B. Calderwood 
ed., 1961).  See NRS ms CH2/523/1, folios 9, 10, 12v (for a similar board in Burntisland parish); NLS 
ms Wod. Oct. IX, folio 5v (same); NLS ms Wod folio XLII, f. 13v (same). 
 29. BUIK OF THE KIRK OF THE CANAGAIT, supra note 28, passim. 
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town, of varying size but usually an odd number, including the ourisman appointed 
by the kirk session.30  They addressed both civil and criminal disputes, although 
sanctions for the latter were sent on to secular magistrates.31  In addition to the 
standing board, the session also created ad hoc mediation panels of “brethren ap-
pointed by the kirk as judge arbitral to reconcile brethren.”32  Their guidelines were 
not to punish, but to draw quarrelers “with lenience to agree with the [other] party, 
to the end they may live in peace in all time coming.”33  Married couples in conflict 
were referred by ministers or sessions to such “honest men being chosen to compose 
the matter betwixt them.”34 At the highest level of Scots ecclesiastical courts, the 
1581 General Assembly sent out commissions to “intervene for reconciling” feud-
ing parties in the west of Scotland, and ordered presbyteries (the mid-level church 
courts) to enforce the regular offering of arbitration in all parishes.35  At the 1583 
presbytery visitation of Holyroodhouse parish, the minister was found negligent in 
assembling panels; he admitted his fault, but only in situations where he was appar-
ently miffed at not himself having been “chosen to be judge arbitral.”36  Clearly 
service as an arbitrator brought with it some status in the community. 
In towns, bailies or borough courts regularly appointed arbitrators to deal with 
the courts’ overloads, especially disputes related to wider community division.  
Cases of failed credit arrangements, slander and defamation, and public quarreling 
predominated.37  Scots bailies often appointed an “assize” in such cases – a group 
of neighbors whose resolution of the argument would be recorded but not pro-
nounced by the court, and whose settlement would be final.38  Select members of 
the council itself could serve as arbitrators, as in the 1582 case of Cramby v. 
Cramby, in which six members became “judges arbitrators and amicable composi-
tors commonly chosen between Thomas Cramby maltman burgess and John 
Cramby his son” concerning a disputed debt “and in special touching seventeen 
merks yearly annuals and that for the mail [rent] of the house presently occupied by 
                                                          
 30. NRS mss CH2/400/1 at 58; NRS mss CH2/636/34, folios 38, 51v; NRS mss CH2/523/1, f.4; NRS 
mss CH2/521/7 at 33; NRS mss CH2/299/2 at 3-5, 20-22, 24-25, 38; NRS mss CH2/424/1, f. 2v.  See 
also New Register House, Edinburgh, ms OPR 310/1, folios 50v, 51v, 57v; BUIK OF THE KIRK OF THE 
CANAGAIT, supra note 28, at 16, 25, 29, 31. 
 31. PERTH KIRK SESSION, supra note 26, at 69 n.2. 
 32. BUIK OF THE KIRK OF THE CANAGAIT, supra note 28, at 31, 32.  See NRS ms CH2/400/1 at 58 
(presenting an ad hoc panel in Falkirk which dealt with a slander case and assigning a £10 bond to ensure 
the parties would abide by the arbitration); NRS ms CH2/636/34, folios 38, 51v (presenting another in 
Kirkcaldy). 
 33. NRS ms CH2/523/1, folios 9, 10. 
 34. PERTH KIRK SESSION, supra note 26, at 375, 380 (stating that three elders appointed in the latter 
case to reconcile spouses, “having respect to the good love and amity [that] should be betwixt [a] man 
and his wife”). 
 35. BOOKE OF THE UNIVERSALL KIRK OF SCOTLAND VOL. 2 at 539 & VOL. 3 at 992 (A. Peterkin ed., 
1839). 
 36. NLS ms Wod. Folio XLII, f. 13-13v.  It is worth noting that arbitration referrals from church courts 
seem to have been a post-Reformation phenomenon in Scotland.  SIMON OLLIVANT, THE COURT OF THE 
OFFICIAL IN PRE-REFORMATION SCOTLAND 146 (1982) (discussing how for the 1540s, only one of the 
221 cases initiated in the Lothian Official’s Court is recorded as being submitted to arbiters). 
 37. See, e.g., Perth Bailies Court records, PKCA mss B59/12 series. 
 38. See PKCA ms B59/12/11, f.2 (Mar. 21, 1648) (numbered from the back of this rough-copy bailies 
court minute book) (providing an example of what the Scots called an “assiza,” in this case to settle a 
testamentary dispute without resort to the distant Commissary Court of St Andrews). The arbitrators in 
this case included merchants, glovers, shoemakers, tailors, and two bailies. PKCA ms B59/12/6 [n.f.] 
(providing a very large numbers of such assizes from the 1570s). 
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John.”39  If a quarrel had already erupted in violence, particularly if it were between 
townsmen and local landowners, arbitration by local notables was the preferred op-
tion, with criminal processes avoided.  In 1593, arbitrators including the earl of 
Gowrie, the laird of Tullybardine, an Edinburgh minister, and the commendator of 
Kinross made a £2000 award to the laird of Clackmannan, to be paid by the burgh 
of Perth 
for the invading of  me [attacking the laird with swords] by the bailies, 
council and community of the said burgh . . . within my house of Gaskon-
hall, demolishing of my said house, spuilzeing [destruction] and taking of 
goods and gear forth of the same, taking and transporting of my person to 
the tolbooth of Perth [the town gaol].40 
The heavy fine was worth it to the town, since the arbitrators also reprimanded 
and bound Clackmannan in future to pay his legal tolls to the town – the initial cause 
of the quarrel so violently addressed by the irate townspeople.41 
In England, resort to arbitration was clearly as typical of provincial towns as of 
London.  The rate at which English borough courts sent disputes to arbitrators is 
unknown in most instances, but in early seventeenth-century King’s Lynn, only 16 
percent of disagreements brought to the borough court proceeded beyond complaint 
to the court clerk: such a complaint functioned in effect as a threat to get the de-
fendant to agree to arbitration and so avoid costly litigation.42  Arbitrators could be 
found internally, but as in Scotland, local gentlemen or nobles could be called in to 
settle particularly divisive conflict within the corporation; in 1619, for instance, the 
town of Chester sought an end to a long dispute between two urban factions, one 
allied with the mayor and the other with the town recorder.43  The town’s assembly 
referred the cause to arbitration by the earl of Derby, lord lieutenant of the county; 
Sir Peter Warburton, a judge of Common Pleas; and Sir Thomas Savage, deputy 
lieutenant and Justice of the Peace of Cheshire, all of whom  had previously been 
elected aldermen of the city, indicating their close patronage ties to the corporation 
                                                          
 39. PKCA ms B59/12/9, folio 42v (Sept. 24, 1582).  See also PKCA ms B/59/12/6, n.f. dated Dec. 5, 
1570 and dated Apr. 23, 1571.  Members of the council arbitrating, in the latter case, a complaint brought 
against a widow for “downcasting” her neighbor’s wall, violating an earlier arbitration award; and 21 
December 1570, appointment of an “assisa” to “decide and to cognose upon the controversies.”  They 
pronounced their award on the same day they received the case.  In 1624 the council ordered two men 
to submit their quarrel to four men;” two councillors and two craftsmasters were selected, the town 
provost “to be ourisman in case they agree not.” PKCA ms B59/16/2, f. 19v.  Of course, townsmen also 
regularly chose their own arbitrators apart from the council, as in a dispute between rival Perth grammar 
school masters. PKCA B59/16/1, f. 337v; cf f. 347v. 
 40. PKCA ms B59/12/2, f. 82. 
 41. Id.  PKCA ms B59/12/2 (providing a fair copy of the decrete arbitral).  Robert Bruce of Clack-
mannan had been a thorn in the side of the burgh for many years, his heavily-armed men regularly 
bringing goods through the town and successfully avoiding tolls with threats of violent reprisal against 
the burgh officers and port keepers.  A single noble arbitrator, David Lord Scone, was agreed upon by 
disputants over a 1612 building project near Perth. PKCA ms B59/16/1, f. 195. 
 42. MULDREW, ECONOMY OF OBLIGATION, supra note 22, at 202-03. 
 43. Catherine Patterson, Conflict Resolution and Patronage in Provincial Towns, 1590-1640, 37 J. OF 
BRITISH STUDIES 1, 1-25 (1998); id. at 3 (citing the Chester Assembly Books and noting throughout the 
article similar settlements in Worcester, Lincoln, Lyme Regis, Chichester, Ipswich, and other towns). 
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and its citizens and their vested interest in the peace of the community.44   The award 
made, urban concord was restored.45 
Records of crafts guilds provide an abundance of evidence for a guild tradition 
of formal and quite binding arbitration of disputes among their own members.  The 
tailors of Perth in 1544, for instance, addressed “injurious words” between two of 
their members in the bailies’ presence with a reminder to the town council that the 
craft should “have the correction of that matter.”   The glovers, following suit, fined 
members who reported insults and injuries to the bailies court before seeking arbi-
tration by the craft deacon.46  The wrights in 1555 had a standing arbitration board 
of eight elected men with the deacon as tie-breaker, and the hammermen [met-
alsmiths] assigned either a deacon or a group of masters “to sit, consider, and dis-
cuss in all actions and debates between brother and brother of the craft, or between 
a master and his apprentice or servant” – an instance of arbitrators settling disputes 
between persons of unequal status.47  Private arbitration between two guilds could 
receive endorsement by the town council, which would tend to underpin the author-
ity of the award.48 
In commercial disputes across the island, if a case were brought to trial in an 
equity court, it was “generally decided by reference to merchant juries or arbitra-
tion,” in part because the principles of law merchant exceeded the scope of common 
law; likewise, once joint-stock companies had been established, company tribunals 
regularly referred disputes to arbitrators, especially for intra-company divisions.49  
Of course, individual businesspeople at odds could and did seek out their own arbi-
trators apart from town, guild, merchant, common law or equity courts.  Generally 
their social peers, these men were charged to “review the circumstances so far as 
they could establish them,” and they had the option of calling witnesses and receiv-
ing depositions as well as hearing the testimonies of the disputants; their overriding 
concern was to seek an agreement that would satisfy both parties and the needs of 
the commercial society on which all their prosperity depended.50  Finally, disputes 
at the highest level were, as we have seen, arbitrated extra-judicially by monarchs, 
bishops, or, in Scotland, Highland chieftains and magnate kin.51  James VI’s direct 
arbitration of disputes among western clan leaders contributed to a drastic reduction 
of blood feud by the early seventeenth century.52 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 3. 
 45. Id. at 4. 
 46. Perth Museum and Art Gallery [PMAG] ms 4, THE TAILORS INCORPORATION BOOK, f. 7, and ms 
2/2, it. 35; PKCA ms 67/1/1, THE GLOVERS INCORPORATION BOOK, fols. 6, at 154 (1595).  See also 
GILD COURT BOOK OF DUNFERMLINE 1433-1579 (E. Torrie ed., 1986) (providing numerous instances 
of another Scottish town court referring cases to arbitrators). 
 47. PMAG ms Wrights, p. 2; NLS ms 19239, THE PERTH HAMMERMEN BOOK, fols. 8 38v, 55v, 60v, 
passim (forbidding private vengeance).  GESTA ABBATUM MONASTERII SANCTI ALBANI 163-70 (Riley, 
II ed., 2012) (providing early English examples of arbitration to reconcile employer and waged or master 
and apprentice); CALENDAR OF CLOSE ROLLS 1461-68 at 230-34 (1892-1954). 
 48. See e.g., PKCA ms B59/12/9, f. 87v (May 27, 1569) (stating “arbitrators and amicable composi-
tors” of a dispute between the wrights and masons guilds, having made their award, both guilds then 
asked the bailies “according to auld ancient use and wont” to “counterpone their authority thereto,”  
which the bailies “found reasonable”). 
 49. Jones, supra note 6, at 453.  The incorporation of law merchant into the common law tradition 
was not achieved until the later eighteenth century.  Id. 
 50. Ingram, supra note 12, at 127. 
 51. Jones, supra note 6, at 455 (discussing how after 1640 private voluntary arbitration was used more 
widely than in previous period, with accelerated use after the 1698 Arbitration Act). 
 52. BROWN, supra note 3, at 215-19, 234-35. 
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After an award was made, reconciliation in the early modern period was very 
often celebrated by a dramatic public ritual, large numbers of witnesses in effect 
serving to enforce future peace, if only by peer pressure.53  Publicity per se tended 
to ensure that the settlement would be kept, since violating an agreement witnessed 
by the whole neighborhood would bring charges of duplicity and undermine repu-
tation.  If arbitrators determined that one party was at fault in a dispute, that person 
could be made formally to process through a town, often to the place where he had 
offended or to the home of the party he had harmed, there to kneel and apologize, 
clasp hands or kiss the plaintiff, and drink his health.54  Mutual offense could result 
in a reverse trip and another exchange of kisses.55  Public oaths never to offend the 
other in future were sealed by the signing of a bond or surety to insure future good 
behavior.56  Oaths sworn on the Scriptures entailed the threat of spiritual sanctions 
for those who violated them; these may not be particularly relevant to modern dis-
pute resolutions, but it is worth bearing in mind that early modern oathbreakers 
suffered in reputation (and therefor business) and risked the salvation of their souls, 
so oaths mattered as much as signed bonds, which imposed fines for those who 
broke them.57  In the 1620s, two women in the Scots town of Yester, for example, 
swore that if they should in future quarrel in public, the one who instigated the dis-
pute would pay 40s to the poor (ad pios usus); and in Dundonald, John Hunter and 
Robert Dickie “voluntarily and of their own proper consents acted themselves to 
live in peace and quietness together hereafter under the pain of £5” from whomever 
broke the peace first.58  Arbitration was clearly binding. 
Finally, particularly divisive cases could have their resolutions celebrated by 
feasting.  The Perth hammermen ordered quarrelers who had been reconciled to 
drink together, and they threw such lavish feasts at these ceremonies that by 1592 
the guild resolved that “what expenses be made . . . upon agreement and pacifica-
tion” should henceforth be borne by the men who had quarreled, lest the craft treas-
ury be emptied.59  (Impressive amounts of drink were consumed at such events: 
after the successful arbitration of a quarrel between two Perth baxters in 1599, one 
Thomas Richie was after two days of indulgence “so drunken . . . that he cannot 
                                                          
 53. MAX GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY 183-207 (1965) (discussing 
the anthropological theory behind this principle).  See e.g., NRS mss CH2/521/2, folio 5, 28v, 106 
(providing examples of the centrality of publicity and witnesses); NRS mss CH2/521/7 at 224-26 (same). 
 54. See e.g., NLS ms 19239, fols. 41v-42v, at 61 (showing that such ceremonies abound in the rec-
ords). 
 55. Consistoire, supra note 25, at 635-48 (providing several examples); see also NRS mss CH2/523/1, 
folio 16v, 17v, 19v, 33 (providing several examples); NRS mss CH2/521/8/2, f. 169v (same); NRS mss 
CH2/716/1, f. 20 (same). 
 56. Wormald, supra note 3, at 54-97; Jenny Wormald, The Bloodfeud in Early Modern Scotland, in 
DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS: LAW AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN THE WEST 101-44 (John  Bossy ed., 
2003); Id. at 123 (discussing bonds).  See NRS mss CH2/266/1, f. 2 (providing additional examples); 
NRS mss CH2/191/1, f. 52 (same); NRS mss CH2/448/2 at 256-57 & 280 (same); NRS mss CH2/377/1, 
f. 57v (same). 
 57. See NRS mss CH2/521/1, f. 6v (providing additional examples); NRS mss CH2/1142/1, f. 18v 
(same); NRS mss CH2/400/1 at 31, 83, 129, 147 (same); NRS mss CH2/4/1, f. 18v (same). 
 58. NRS ms CH2/377/1, f. 57v (cf. folio 52v).  Compare THE SESSION BOOK OF DUNDONALD 1602-
1721 at 23 (Henry Paton ed., 1936) with id. at 326, 412 (‘Acting’ oneself could be the signing of a bond 
by the literate or the swearing of an oath, generally in the presence of a scribe or notary, by the illiterate.). 
 59. Or if he were the one who decided to throw a reconciliation feast, then paid by the deacon person-
ally; however, upon this ruling the deacon for the first time was given a stipend of £4 to help defray the 
expenses of his office. NLS ms 19239, f. 56; see also id. at folios 67, 67v (ordering that those reconciled 
drink together). 
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walk or convey himself upon the streets.”)60  James VI feasted newly reconciled 
magnates in Holyrood before making them process the Royal Mile holding hands 
with their enemies.61  And in the Chester case cited above, the arbitrators “made Mr 
Mayor and Mr Recorder friends, and Sir Thomas Savage bestowed a fat buck on 
either of them upon condition that the one should sup the other at their own houses, 
with the aldermen and other friends on both sides,” which they did, together with 
the earl of Derby and other local gentry, showing “the whole community that dis-
cord had ended and that friendship and unity had returned.”62  
With these advantages, what may seem surprising is that so many disputes 
moved on to arbitration only after being initiated in the courts.  There are multiple 
factors at work in moving them out of the judicial system, perhaps the most im-
portant being the pressure of business in the courts themselves – a strong motivation 
to get rid of cases whenever possible.  Another, in the case of ecclesiastical courts, 
is that canon law itself had systematically encouraged shifting disputes away from 
church courts to arbitration, from at least the thirteenth century on, in regard for the 
greater religious purpose of peace-keeping.63  But why did many plaintiffs start with 
the more expensive and lengthy litigation process, or pursue both simultaneously?64 
One obvious explanation is that the threat of litigation served as a powerful 
prod to get a foe to agree to arbitration, given the threat litigation posed to one’s 
purse and time.  Another motive is the hope that one might get multiple decisions 
from multiple venues, including arbitration, and be able to choose the most advan-
tageous.  Finally, whatever the drawbacks of the courts, they did have the clout to 
enforce an arbitration award, with mechanisms more immediate and concrete than 
the dread of divine retribution for breaking an oath. 
Since judges in all kinds of courts were by all accounts happy to refer cases to 
arbitrators, what happened in the early modern period to lead later students of dis-
pute resolution to the quite false presumption that arbitration was always extra-ju-
dicial, and that the courts were enemies of the process?  The culprit seems to be a 
misunderstanding of Robert Vynior’s case, an action brought to the Court of Com-
mon Pleas in 1609 against William Wilde for his failure to pay a bond of £20 or-
dered by arbitrators to resolve a dispute over “divers kinds of parish business.”65  
Wilde said that he had withdrawn from the case before the arbitrators had rendered 
judgment, but the court ruled for Vynior.66  Chief Justice Coke, however, conceded 
that Wilde had the right to revoke his submission to arbitration since (as his char-
acteristically convoluted prose puts it) “a man cannot by his act make such author-
ity, power or warrant not, which by the law and of his nature is.”67  Many modern 
jurists seem to consider this case as the legal origin of non-binding arbitration; they 
apparently see common law courts as jealous of the alternative path to resolution.68 
                                                          
 60. See also NRS ms CH2/521/3 at 101; NRS ms CH2/523/1, f. 22 (providing a situation similar to 
the 1605 instance). 
 61. NLS ms Wod. Oct. VII, f. 18. 
 62. Patterson, supra note 43, at 4. 
 63. Powell, Arbitration, supra note 1, at 53-55. 
 64. They had been doing so since the later Middle Ages. Id. at 52. 
 65. SIR EDWARD COKE. REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT.: IN THIRTEEN PARTS, PART IV – 81B. 
299-306, 300 (1826). 
 66. Id. at 303-04. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See e.g., COHEN, supra note 2, at 95, 105, 125-126, 128-142. 
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Coke, however, needs to be read with more attention to his own historical con-
text.  In reality, seventeenth-century plaintiffs shopped for verdicts by submitting 
suits to multiple jurisdictions (arbitrators and/or courts) and then revoking submis-
sions when proceedings started to go against them.69  A nice illustration is the 1617 
case Middleton v. Lort et al, a dispute involving church property, brought in Chan-
cery as well as an ecclesiastical court, with the defendants ultimately complaining 
that their opponent “in order to vex the defendants with multiplicity of suits” had 
“taken proceedings in . . . five other courts.”70  In the same year, the Spanish am-
bassador took a case against Richard Bingley, commander of the HMS Dread-
nought (concerning seizure of Spanish goods after a pirate attack) from the Admi-
ralty Court to Common Pleas, and then to arbitration, with the award of the arbitra-
tors enforced by an order from the Common Pleas judges for the ambassador to 
submit a bill of discovery in Chancery – all, in the words of Francis Bacon, “in aid 
of the arbitration.”71  In all likelihood, Coke was simply reflecting general practice, 
rather than pronouncing a foundational legal principle.  De facto, once a case 
reached arbitration, the award was understood by its contemporary fans as binding.  
It is worth noting that when Francis Bacon as Lord Chancellor sought information 
about social structures and customs in foreign lands, he instructed his agents to re-
port “what good establishments [they had] to prevent the necessities and discon-
tentments of the people, to cut off suits at law and quarrels.”72  He was typical of 
his time in recognizing mechanisms for settling quarrels outside the courts as sig-
nifiers of particularly enlightened societies. 
It is the case that arbitration awards were on rare occasions contested, some-
times successfully; however, a close look at such instances reveals exceptions that 
prove the rule: In Moor v. Hinton (1678), Lord Nottingham in Chancery upheld a 
challenge to the award of Mr Saunders of the Middle Temple “because of the man-
ifest partiality and injustice of it, . . . for a court of conscience will never confirm or 
decree an award against conscience.”73  The clear message is that disputants should 
choose their arbitrators wisely – not that arbitration awards are not binding. 
The conclusion drawn above concerning Vynior’s case gains support and fur-
ther explanation from a glance at the Arbitration Act of 1698 (the “Locke Act,” after 
its author) by which Parliament confirmed the binding nature of arbitration by call-
ing a violation of an arbitrated agreement contempt of court, not just a violation of 
contract: 
It hath been found by experience that references [to arbitration] made by 
rule of court have contributed much to the ease of the subject in the deter-
mining of controversies because the parties become thereby obliged to 
                                                          
 69. Edward Stringham & Todd Zywicki, Rivalry and Superior Dispatch: An Analysis of Competing 
Courts in Medieval and Early Modern England, 147 PUBLIC CHOICE 497, 497-524 (2011). 
 70. REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED BY FRANCIS BACON IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 59-61 (John 
Ritchie ed., 1932). 
 71. Id. at 44-45. 
 72. JAMES SPEDDING, THE LETTERS AND THE LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON, Vol. II at 17 (1861). 
 73. Lord Nottingham’s Chancery Cases, supra note 19, at 619.  See also id. at 699 (citing the 1678 
case Thomson v. Wood  in which an arbitration decree was overruled by Nottingham in Chancery “as 
obtained by corruption” and the arbitrator’s denial of  corruption “overruled as frivolous because it 
tended to prevent all examination or proof of the corruption denied.”). 
11
Todd: For Eschewing of Trouble and Exorbitant Expense: Arbitration in t
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
18 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2016 
submit to the award of the arbitrators under penalty of imprisonment for 
their contempt in case they refuse. 
The parties were henceforth required to include “their agreement . . . [and] the 
bond or promise whereby they have obliged themselves” into the court record by 
filing an affidavit; if they then disobeyed, they were subject to “all the penalties of 
contemning a Rule of Court,” and their only recourse would be to demonstrate con-
vincingly that the arbitrator had misbehaved or was corrupt.74  The act made awards 
into rules of court, and enforced them as such. 
Other evidence for this read of Vynior’s case is simply the rising use of arbi-
tration over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Daniel Defoe’s 
famous recommendation in The Compleat English Tradesman reflects this reality: 
“The honest peaceble tradesman will, as far as in him lies, prevent a decision at 
law” and rather bring differences to “a friendly accommodation by expostulation, 
by application, by arbitration.”75  From the second half of the seventeenth century 
there are increasing references to arbitration in form books and tradesmen’s manu-
als, and an impressive upsurge in the numbers of legal textbooks on arbitration was 
a marker of the period.76  By the latter half of the eighteenth century, no less a jurist 
than Chief Justice Mansfield would be found a notable friend of arbitration, not only 
in decision (like so many of his predecessors at all levels of the judiciary), but also 
in principle.  In the still quite violent society of the eighteenth century, he would 
have been foolish not to be. 
                                                          
 74. 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15 (Eng.).  Henry Horwitz & James Oldham, John Locke, Lord Mansfield, and 
Arbitration during the Eighteenth Century, 36 HIST. J. 137, 146 & 155 (Mar. 1993). 
 75. DANIEL DEFOE, THE COMPLEAT ENGLISH TRADESMAN, VOL. 2 119 (1727). 
 76. Jones, supra, note 6, at 456-57. 
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